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ABSTRACT
Case Name: Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018).
Jurisdiction: Supreme Court of the United States.
Plainti (s): Ashley SVEEN, et al.,
Defendant(s): Kaye MELIN.
Concepts: Wills; Trusts; Estate Planning; Revocation-on-divorce statutes; Contracts Clause
under the Constitution.
Nature of Case: Does the retroactive application of a revocation-on-divorce statute to
contracts entered into prior to the enactment of the statute violate the Contracts Clause of the
Constitution?1
Lower Ct. Decision: The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary
judgment for the Sveen children.2
Appellate Decision: The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that a
“revocation-upon-divorce statute like [Minnesota’s] violates the Contract Clause when applied
retroactively.”3
Sup. Ct. Decision: The Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that the Minnesota revocation-on-divorce

statute did not violate the Contracts Clause as applied in the Sveen case.4 Reversing the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanding the case for further proceedings.

INTRODUCTION
In 1997, Mark Sveen bought a life insurance policy insuring his life; later on that year he
married Kaye Melin. In 1998, Sveen named Melin as primary beneficiary on the policy with his
two children from a prior marriage (Ashley and Antone Sveen) as contingent
beneficiaries. Sveen and Melin divorced in 2007. Sveen took no action then or later, to revise
his beneficiary designations, even as many other assets were divided as part of the SveenMelin divorce decree.5
In 2002, Minnesota amended its revocation-on-divorce statute previously only applied to wills
executed prior to dissolution or annulment of marriage, to include “any revocable …
disposition, beneficiary designation, or appointment of property made by an individual to the
individual’s former spouse[.]”6
Sveen died in 2011, the life insurance company requested judgment on who should be the
recipient of the life insurance proceeds.7 Sveen’s children moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the revocation-on-divorce statute8 automatically revoked the policy’s designation
of Melin as primary beneficiary, leaving Sveen’s children to take the proceeds. Melin asserted
that she should receive the proceeds based on the argument that the retroactive application of
the Minnesota statute violated the Contracts Clause in the US Constitution.9
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment for the Sveen
children, awarding them the insurance proceeds.10 The court reasoned that the beneficiary of a
life insurance policy has no vested interest in the policy until the insured dies.11 Without a
vested interest, Melin had no “protectable contractual relationship, and thus [there was] no
impairment of contract.”12
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded.13 The Eighth Circuit
was bound by its decision in the Whirlpool case, in which the court found that a similar
revocation-divorce statute in Oklahoma violated the Contracts Clause when applied
retroactively.14 The Whirlpool facts were virtually identical to those in Sveen, and the Eighth

Circuit found that in the Whirlpool case “[the policyholder] was entitled to expect that his
wishes regarding the insurance proceeds, as ascertained pursuant to this then-existing law,
would be e ectuated.”15 The court found that the policyholder’s ability to opt out of the law by
predesignating his now ex-wife as the beneficiary of the policy did not resolve the
constitutional issue because the statute’s e ect still “directly alter[ed]” expectations of the
policyholder.16

BACKGROUND
Legislation usually applies only prospectively, ensuring people have fair warning of the law’s
demands.17 In regards to legislation a ecting contracts, the Constitution hardens the
presumption of prospectivity into a mandate.18 James Madison even acknowledged the
“inconvenience” a categorical rule could sometimes entail “but thought on the whole it would
be overbalanced by the utility of it.”19 The Court followed the absolute line construed the
Contracts Clause in this light for many years.20 However, the Clause also le room for
legislatures to address changing social conditions, as long as substantive contractual rights are
protected (The “Obligation of Contracts” that the Clause protects.)21
The Court must consider several factors when analyzing potential Contract Clause violations.22
First, the question is whether the law “operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual
relationship.” Factors include “the extent to which the law undermines the contractual bargain,
interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding or
reinstating his rights.”23 If a court finds substantial impairment of a contractual relationship,
the court must then decide whether the law was “drawn in an appropriate and reasonable way
to advance a significant and legitimate public purpose.”24
This Supreme Court has recognized that when a State alters life insurance contracts by undoing
their beneficiary designations it surely “substantially impairs” them. Holding that a law
“displac[ing] the beneficiary selected by the insured … and plac[ing] someone else in her stead
… frustrates” a scheme designed to deliver proceeds to the named beneficiary.25
But it should be noted that the legal system has o en used default rules to resolve estate
litigation in a way that conforms to decedents’ presumed intent.26 Courts reasoned that the
average person would prefer that allocation to the one in the old will, given the intervening life

events.27 Changes in society have brought about changes in the laws governing revocation of
wills. From removing gender distinctions to enacting statutes giving a new spouse or child a
specified share of the decedent’s estate while leaving the rest of his will intact.28 As divorce
became more prevalent in the 1980s, the majority of States enacted revocation-on-divorce
statutes,29 treating an individual’s divorce as voiding a testamentary bequest to a former
spouse. Like the common-law rule, those laws rest on a “judgment about the typical testator’s
probable intent.”30
States over time have extended their revocation-on-divorce statutes from wills to “will
substitutes,” such as revocable trusts, pension accounts, and life insurance policies.31 Asserting
that the typical decedent would no more want his former spouse to benefit from his pension
plan or life insurance than to inherit under their will. So a decedent’s failure to change his
beneficiary probably resulted from “inattention,” not “intention.”32

CASE DESCRIPTION
The Contracts Clause restricts the power of States to disrupt contractual arrangements
including insurance policies.33 But not all laws a ecting pre-existing contracts violate the
Clause.34
In Sveen we must look to whether the State law has “operated as substantial impairment of a
contractual relationship”35 and if the law interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations,
preventing the party from safeguarding or reinstating his rights.36 If such factors show a
“substantial impairment”, we then look to whether the State law is an “appropriate” and
“reasonable” way to advance “a significant and legitimate public purpose.”37
The Court held that Minnesota’s revocation-on-divorce statute does not substantially impair
pre-existing contractual arrangements. Melin argued, the “whole point” of buying life
insurance is to provide the proceeds to the named beneficiary.38 But three aspects of
Minnesota’s law, taken together, defeat Melin’s argument that the change it e ected “severely
impaired” her ex-husband’s contract.
First, the Minnesota statute furthers the policyholder’s intent the dra ers reasonably thought
most typical. Legislatures have long made judgments about a decedent’s likely testamentary
intent a er substantive life changes39 (particularly divorce) and enacted statutes revoking

earlier-made wills by operation of law. This is because they accurately reflect the intent of most
divorcing parties. “The insured’s failure to change the beneficiary a er a divorce is more likely
the result of neglect than choice. And that means the Minnesota statute o en honors, not
undermines, the intent of the only contracting party to care about the beneficiary term. The
law no doubt changes how the insurance contract operates. But does it impair the contract?
Quite the opposite for lots of policyholders.”40
Secondly, the Minnesota law is unlikely to upset a policyholder’s expectations at the time of
contracting, because an insured cannot reasonably rely on a beneficiary designation remaining
in place a er a divorce. Divorce courts have wide discretion to divide property between
spouses when a marriage ends, and here the insurance policy was not included in the SveenMelin divorce decree41 even though it could’ve been.
Thirdly, the law puts in place a presumption about “what an insured wants a er divorcing”. But
if the presumption is wrong, the insured may overthrow it with the simple act of sending a
change-of-beneficiary form to his insurer, or agree to a divorce settlement continuing his exspouse’s beneficiary status. “That action restores his former spouse to the position she held
before the divorce – and in so doing, cancels the state law’s operation. The statute thus reduces
to a paperwork requirement (and a fairly painless one, at that): File a form and the statutory
default rule gives way to the original beneficiary designation.”42
The Court has held for many years that laws imposing such “minimal paperwork burdens” do
not violate the Contracts Clause.43 Importantly, here, when Sveen does not redesignate his exspouse as beneficiary, his right to insurance does not lapse, it is that his contingent
beneficiaries (here, his children) receive the money.
Melin urged the Court to distinguish between two ways a law can a ect a contract. She argued
Minnesota law “operate[s] on the contract itself” by “directly chang[ing] an express term” (the
insured’s beneficiary designation).44 In contrast, the recording statutes “impose a
consequence” for failing to abide by a “procedural” obligation extraneous to the agreement
(the State’s recording or notification rule).45 The di erence, in Melin’s view, parallels the line
between rights and remedies: The Minnesota law explicitly alters a person’s entitlement under
the contract, while the recording laws interfere with his ability to enforce that entitlement
against others.46

The Court rejected this argument stating that the Minnesota statute also “impose[s] a
consequence” for not satisfying a burden outside the contract47 as the law overrides a
beneficiary designation only when the insured fails to send in a form to his insurer, and the
laws above enable a party to safeguard those benefits by taking an action.
Justice Gorsuch, dissenting, followed a strict (Federalist)48 interpretation of the constitution,
stating that “[b]ecause legislation o en disrupts existing social arrangements, it usually
applies only prospectively. This longstanding and ‘sacred’ principle ensures that people have
fair warning of the law’s demands.”49 Further, that the Constitution hardens the presumption
of prospectivity into a mandate with the Contracts Clause categorically prohibiting state from
passing “any … Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”50

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held that the retroactive application of a Minnesota statute that revokes
spousal beneficiary designations in insurance policies upon the spouses’ divorce does not
violate the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. Determining two tests to this
end. First, whether the state law has “operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual
relationship,” considering the extent to which the law undermines the contractual bargain,
interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding or
reinstating his rights. Second, If such factors show a substantial impairment, is the state law
drawn in an appropriate and reasonable way to advance a significant and legitimate public
purpose.
The Court concluded that Minnesota’s law does not substantially impair pre-existing
contractual arrangements. Stopping at the first step and citing three reasons for its conclusion:
(1) the statute is unlikely to disturb any policyholder’s expectations at the time of contracting
because an insured cannot reasonably rely on beneficiary designation remaining in place a er
a divorce; (2) the statute is designed to reflect a policyholder’s intent and to support the
contractual scheme; and (3) the statute supplies a mere default presumptive rule, which the
policyholder can undo at will.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
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